Linksys WRT54GH User Manual

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So add the following to both client and server configurations: NCCIC encourages users and administrators to refer to their hardware and software vendors for the most recent information. And that's just not being a good net citizen! Does the Router support ICQ send file? We already have your email address on file. Mousecape is as non-instrusive as possible, never asking you for your password for anything. These purposes ranged from the creation of additional accounts to cleanup of activity.

Fettes Programming Solutions


Mode Tunnel versus Mode Transport? Preshared key versus Certificats? Qu'est ce que le DPD? Peut-on modifier le port IKE? Peut on rendre l'interface utilisateur invisible? Comment lancer automatiquement l'application CRM, lorsque le tunnel IPsec de l'intranet entreprise s'ouvre.

Quels algorithmes de hachage sont pris en charge? Comment voir les connexions VPN? Comment forcer tout le trafic Internet dans le tunnel VPN? A propos du support de Windows XP? Qu'est ce que cela veut dire? Tunnel VPN ouvert mais le ping ne fonctionne pas? Erreur "received remote ID other than expected"? Erreur "Default UDP create: Protection contre les attaques de type "deni de service". Vous pouvez aussi contribuer aux traductions du logiciel via la page de traduction du logiciel VPN.

SMI is an unauthenticated management protocol developed by Cisco. This protocol supports a feature that allows network administrators to download or overwrite any file on any Cisco router or switch that supports this feature. This feature is designed to enable network administrators to remotely install and configure new devices and install new OS files.

Commercial and government security organizations have noted that Russian state-sponsored cyber actors have leveraged the SIET to abuse SMI to download current configuration files. Of concern, any actor may leverage this capability to overwrite files to modify the device configurations, or upload maliciously modified OS or firmware to enable persistence.

Additionally, these network devices have writeable file structures where malware for other platforms may be stored to support lateral movement throughout the targeted network. Cyber actors masquerade as legitimate users to log into a device or establish a connection via a previously uploaded OS image with a backdoor.

Once successfully logged into the device, cyber actors execute privileged commands. These cyber actors create a man-in-the-middle scenario that allows them to. At this stage, cyber actors are not restricted from modifying or denying traffic to and from the victim. Although there are no reports of this activity, it is technically possible. Review network device logs and netflow data for indications of TCP Telnet-protocol traffic directed at port 23 on all network device hosts.

Although Telnet may be directed at other ports e. Inspect any indication of Telnet sessions or attempts. Because Telnet is an unencrypted protocol, session traffic will reveal command line interface CLI command sequences appropriate for the make and model of the device.

CLI strings may reveal login procedures, presentation of user credentials, commands to display boot or running configuration, copying files and creation or destruction of GRE tunnels, etc. Because SNMP is a management tool, any such traffic that is not from a trusted management host on an internal network should be investigated.

Review the source address of SNMP traffic for indications of addresses that spoof the address space of the network. Because TFTP is an unencrypted protocol, session traffic will reveal strings associated with configuration data appropriate for the make and model of the device. Review network device logs and netflow data for indications of TCP SMI protocol traffic directed at port of all network-device hosts.

Because SMI is a management feature, any traffic that is not from a trusted management host on an internal network should be investigated. Of note, between June 29 and July 6, , Russian actors used the SMI protocol to scan for vulnerable network devices.

Two Russian cyber actors controlled hosts Because TFTP is an unencrypted protocol, session traffic will reveal strings appropriate for the make and model of the device. The following signature may be used to detect SMI usage.

Flag as suspicious and investigate SMI traffic arriving from outside the network boundary. If SMI is not used inside the network, any SMI traffic arriving on an internal interface should be flagged as suspicious and investigated for the existence of an unauthorized SMI director. If SMI is used inside the network, ensure that the traffic is coming from an authorized SMI director, and not from a bogus director.

In general, exploitation attempts with the SIET tool will likely arrive from outside the network boundary. However, before attempting to tune or limit the range of these signatures, i. Inspect the presence of protocol 47 traffic flowing to or from unexpected addresses, or unexplained presence of GRE tunnel creation, modification, or destruction in log files.

There is a significant amount of publically available cybersecurity guidance and best practices from DHS, allied government, vendors, and the private-sector cybersecurity community on mitigation strategies for the exploitation vectors described above.

The following are additional mitigations for network device manufacturers, ISPs, and owners or operators. Operating System Fingerprinting is analyzing characteristics of packets sent by a target, such as packet headers or listening ports, to identify the operating system in use on the target.

Spear phishing is an attempt by an individual or group to solicit personal information from unsuspecting users by employing social engineering techniques. Phishing emails are crafted to appear as if they were sent from a legitimate organization or known individual.

These emails often attempt to entice users to click on a link that will take the user to a fraudulent website that appears legitimate. The user then may be asked to provide personal information, such as account usernames and passwords, which can further expose them to future compromises. In a watering hole attack , the attacker compromises a site likely to be visited by a particular target group, rather than attacking the target group directly.

DHS encourages recipients who identify the use of tools or techniques discussed in this document to report information to NCCIC or law enforcement immediately.

Commands associated with Cisco IOS. These strings may be seen in inbound network traffic of unencrypted management tools such as Telnet or HTTP, in the logs of application layer firewalls, or in the logs of network devices. Network device owners and operators should review the Cisco documentation of their particular makes and models for strings that would allow the owner or operator to customize the list for an Intrusion Detection System IDS. Detecting commands from Internet-based hosts should be a cause for concern and further investigation.

Detecting these strings in network traffic or log files does not confirm compromise. Further analysis is necessary to remove false positives. This is a subset of the possible strings. Network device owners and operators should export the configuration of their particular makes and models to a secure host and examine it for strings that would allow the owner or operator to customize the list for an IDS.

Detecting outbound configuration data leaving an organization destined for Internet-based hosts should be a cause for concern and further investigation to ensure the destination is authorized to receive the configuration data.

Because configuration data provides an adversary with information—such as the password hashes—to enable future attacks, configuration data should be encrypted between sender and receiver. In such cases, the outbound file would be sent via TFTP. Russian state-sponsored cyber actors could potentially target the network devices from other manufacturers. Therefore, operators and owners should review the documentation associated with the make and model they have in operation to identify strings associated with administrative functions.

Export the current configuration and identify strings associated with the configuration. Place the device-specific administrative and configuration strings into network-based and host-based IDS. Examples for MicroTic may include: See the documentation for your make and model for specific strings and parameters to place on watch. These strings may be seen in inbound network traffic of unencrypted management tools such as Telnet or HTTP, in the logs of application layer firewalls or network devices.

Between June 29 and July 6, , Russian actors used the Cisco Smart Install protocol to scan for vulnerable network devices. Two Russian cyber actor-controlled hosts, In early July , the commands sent to targets changed slightly, copying the running configuration file instead of the startup configuration file.

Additionally, the second command copies the file saved to flash memory instead of directly copying the configuration file. According to information derived from FBI investigations, malicious cyber actors are increasingly using a style of brute force attack known as password spraying against organizations in the United States and abroad.

On February , the Department of Justice in the Southern District of New York, indicted nine Iranian nationals, who were associated with the Mabna Institute, for computer intrusion offenses related to activity described in this report.

The techniques and activity described herein, while characteristic of Mabna actors, are not limited solely to use by this group. In a traditional brute-force attack, a malicious actor attempts to gain unauthorized access to a single account by guessing the password. This can quickly result in a targeted account getting locked-out, as commonly used account-lockout policies allow three to five bad attempts during a set period of time.

This technique allows the actor to remain undetected by avoiding rapid or frequent account lockouts. Password spray campaigns typically target single sign-on SSO and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols. An actor may target this specific protocol because federated authentication can help mask malicious traffic.

Additionally, by targeting SSO applications, malicious actors hope to maximize access to intellectual property during a successful compromise. Email applications are also targeted. Traditional tactics, techniques, and procedures TTPs for conducting the password-spray attacks are as follows:. The vast majority of known password spray victims share some of the following characteristics [1] [2]:.

A successful network intrusion can have severe impacts, particularly if the compromise becomes public and sensitive information is exposed. CyWatch can be contacted by phone at or by e-mail at CyWatch ic. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.

This alert provides information on Russian government actions targeting U. Government entities as well as organizations in the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors. It also contains indicators of compromise IOCs and technical details on the tactics, techniques, and procedures TTPs used by Russian government cyber actors on compromised victim networks.

DHS and FBI produced this alert to educate network defenders to enhance their ability to identify and reduce exposure to malicious activity. After obtaining access, the Russian government cyber actors conducted network reconnaissance, moved laterally, and collected information pertaining to Industrial Control Systems ICS. Contact DHS or law enforcement immediately to report an intrusion and to request incident response resources or technical assistance.

Analysis by DHS and FBI, resulted in the identification of distinct indicators and behaviors related to this activity. Of note, the report Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group, released by Symantec on September 6, , provides additional information about this ongoing campaign.

This campaign comprises two distinct categories of victims: Phases of the model include reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, and actions on the objective. The threat actors appear to have deliberately chosen the organizations they targeted, rather than pursuing them as targets of opportunity. Staging targets held preexisting relationships with many of the intended targets. DHS analysis identified the threat actors accessing publicly available information hosted by organization-monitored networks during the reconnaissance phase.

Based on forensic analysis, DHS assesses the threat actors sought information on network and organizational design and control system capabilities within organizations. These tactics are commonly used to collect the information needed for targeted spear-phishing attempts. In some cases, information posted to company websites, especially information that may appear to be innocuous, may contain operationally sensitive information. As an example, the threat actors downloaded a small photo from a publicly accessible human resources page.

The image, when expanded, was a high-resolution photo that displayed control systems equipment models and status information in the background. Additionally, the threat actors attempted to remotely access infrastructure such as corporate web-based email and virtual private network VPN connections.

Throughout the spear-phishing campaign, the threat actors used email attachments to leverage legitimate Microsoft Office functions for retrieving a document from a remote server using the Server Message Block SMB protocol. An example of this request is: After obtaining a credential hash, the threat actors can use password-cracking techniques to obtain the plaintext password. With valid credentials, the threat actors are able to masquerade as authorized users in environments that use single-factor authentication.

Threat actors compromised the infrastructure of trusted organizations to reach intended targets. Although these watering holes may host legitimate content developed by reputable organizations, the threat actors altered websites to contain and reference malicious content. The threat actors used legitimate credentials to access and directly modify the website content. This request accomplishes a similar technique observed in the spear-phishing documents for credential harvesting.

The file was modified to contain the contents below:. When compromising staging target networks, the threat actors used spear-phishing emails that differed from previously reported TTPs.

Note the inclusion of two single back ticks at the beginning of the attachment name. The PDF was not malicious and did not contain any active code.

The document contained a shortened URL that, when clicked, led users to a website that prompted the user for email address and password. In previous reporting, DHS and FBI noted that all of these spear-phishing emails referred to control systems or process control systems. The threat actors continued using these themes specifically against intended target organizations. Email messages included references to common industrial control equipment and protocols.

The threat actors used distinct and unusual TTPs in the phishing campaign directed at staging targets. Emails contained successive redirects to http: If you are not sure which channel to select, then keep the default, Auto.

The Router supports the following wireless security mode options: Advanced Configuration Chapter 3 authentication, the sender and the recipient do NOT error rate, you may slightly increase the Fragmentation use a WEP key for authentication.

With Shared Key Threshold. Setting the Fragmentation Threshold too low authentication, the sender and recipient use a WEP key for may result in poor network performance. Summary Status Policies are disabled by default. Advanced Configuration Chapter 3 5. Select the appropriate option, Deny or Allow, depending on whether you want to block or allow Internet access for the computers you listed on the Internet Access PC List screen. Decide which days and what times you want this policy to be enforced.

DMZ hosting forwards all the ports at the same time to one computer. Otherwise, keep the default, Disabled. Do not restore the factory defaults unless firmware upgrade file from the Linksys website, you are having difficulties with the Router and www.

The modem does not have an Ethernet port. If your questions are not addressed here, refer Linksys website, The modem is a dial-up modem for traditional dial-up www. Specifications Appendix B Appendix B: Have your product serial number and proof of purchase on hand when calling. Do not use this product near water, for example, in a wet basement or near a swimming pool.

Avoid using this product during an Operation is subject to the following two conditions: Other than as set forth in this suitability, functionality, or legality of any sites or products Agreement, you may not i make or distribute copies to which links may be provided or third party services, and of the Software or its related Documentation, or you hereby waive any claim you might have against Cisco electronically transfer the Software or Documentation Software End User License Agreement Appendix E Software can enable any other computer on the same part of the installation process or by requesting a change primary network to generate reports.

When a computer to your software settings in the error process. Installing is enabled, that computer shows a notification that it is the software and changing these software settings may being monitored.

Software End User License Agreement Appendix E send you Service related email messages as long as you For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, are a subscriber to the Service.


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